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UNFCCC COP-18
Marginal Progress and Challenges Ahead
by Annalisa Savaresi*
The UNFCCC COP-18 held in Doha in December 
2012 is likely to be remembered as a marginal advance 
in the chaotic path towards a more ambitious climate 
change regime. The meeting was largely expected to be 
a procedural transition towards “a protocol, another legal 
instrument or a legal outcome under the Convention” to 
be adopted by 2015 and implemented from 2020.1 Once 
more, Parties managed to salvage the process from the 
brink of collapse, with yet another coup de théâtre. As 
already happened in 2010, the Presidency had to prevent 
a single opposition party from blocking the adoption of a 
set of decisions at the closure of the meeting. Observers to 
this troubled international process are getting used to these 
procedural skirmishes, which are engendered by the fact 
that, 20 years on from the adoption of the Convention, the 
UNFCCC COP still lacks rules of procedure on voting. 
Without attempting to exhaustively cover all decisions 
adopted in Doha, this review summarises developments 
at COP-18, as well as outstanding questions remaining on 
the negotiation table.
Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action Closes 
COP-18 wrote the closing words of the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under 
the Convention (AWG-LCA). This process, established 
with the Bali Action Plan in 2007, held the promise of 
bringing more Parties towards emission reductions, by 
abandoning the dichotomy between Annex-I and Non-
Annex-I Parties embedded in the Kyoto Protocol, in favour 
of a more sobering distinction between “developed” and 
“developing” countries. The negotiation agenda for the 
AWG-LCA centred around five core elements, namely: a 
shared vision on long-term cooperative action to achieve 
the ultimate objective of the Convention; and enhanced 
action on mitigation, adaptation, technology development 
and transfer, and the provision of financial resources. 
Whereas the AWG-LCA was expected to conclude its 
work at COP-15 in Copenhagen in 2009, its mandate was 
extended at subsequent meetings, sparking fears that the 
machinery set up by the Convention may be on the brink 
of collapse.
Over the years, in fact, the Bali Action Plan was 
increasingly perceived as a perpetuation of the so-
called “firewall” between developed-country Parties’ 
“commitments” and developing-country Parties’ “actions”.2 
Conversely, an increasingly large number of Parties opined 
that the distinction between the obligations of developed 
and developing-country Parties should be revisited. In 
2011, to disentangle the deadlock affecting negotiations, 
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Parties decided to rewrite the negotiation agenda set in Bali 
and establish a new negotiation platform (the so-called 
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), see infra).
Before this work could start in earnest, however, it was 
necessary that the AWG-LCA should formally come to a 
close. At COP-18, therefore, the AWG-LCA was officially 
closed, without providing definitive answers to the thorny 
questions it had been asked to address. As shall be seen, these 
matters are now left to the ADP and the subsidiary bodies. 
The decision marking the inglorious conclusion of the 
AWG-LCA features a 20-page text of little substance.3 
The section on a “shared vision for long-term cooperative 
action” remarkably consists of three short paragraphs 
reasserting the commitment to keeping the increase in 
global average temperature to less than 2°C above pre-
industrial levels, and takes steps to ensure that global 
greenhouse gas emissions peak, globally, “as soon as 
possible”. While it had been hoped that Parties might agree 
upon a timeline for surmounting that peak, and starting 
down the other side, the decision only vaguely mentions 
that such a time-frame “will be longer in developing 
countries”. Another notable feature is confirmation that 
Parties’ efforts should be undertaken “on the basis of 
equity and common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities”. This reference to principles 
entrenched in the UNFCCC was opposed by the US, who 
accepted this text only “to the extent that it is not read in 
a manner that is inconsistent with the Convention or the 
Cancun agreements”.4 
The lengthiest section in the decision is that concerning 
mitigation. The text “takes note” of the quantified economy-
wide emission reduction targets reported by Annex-I 
Parties, urging them to increase the level of ambition. 
The text, however, does little to address the question of 
comparability of efforts. The so-called “pledge and review” 
approach famously inaugurated with the Copenhagen 
Accord has enabled Parties to define their commitments 
unilaterally, with the UNFCCC machinery functioning as 
a notary.5 It has, however, become apparent that States 
have reported their pledges as they see fit – for example, 
by choosing different years as a baseline to measure their 
emission reductions – thus engendering a great deal of 
confusion as to what they are actually committing to. The 
AWG-LCA was tasked to address this issue, but failed 
to reach an agreement. COP-18 has established a new 
working programme, with the objective to “continue the 
process of clarifying” the emission reduction targets of 
developed-country Parties, identifying common elements 
and ensuring comparability of efforts. The Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) 
will present the outcome of its work on the issue at COP-
20 in 2014. 
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A similar dithering approach characterises the text on 
mitigation actions by developing-country Parties. Here 
also, the COP established a work programme, this time 
under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), to 
“further the understanding of the diversity of nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions”.
Little progress was made also on “policy approaches 
and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
in developing countries; and the role of conservation, 
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of 
forest carbon stocks in developing countries” (so-called 
REDD+). Once considered a rare ground for REDD+ 
negotiations and consensus, Doha stalled upon questions 
concerning “results-based finance”; incentives for 
“non-carbon benefits”; “non-market-based approaches” 
to support REDD+ activities; and the quest for a new 
institutional home, after the closure of the AWG-LCA. 
These thorny issues will now be addressed under different 
umbrellas, involving the SBI, the SBSTA and a newly 
established work programme. The inclusion of incentives 
for non-carbon benefits and non-market-based approaches 
on the agenda for negotiation may be regarded as a victory 
by those Parties (like Bolivia) that have consistently tried 
to shift the discussion on REDD+ away from a focus on 
carbon markets. Nevertheless, these developments may 
further engulf negotiations, which are now five years in the 
making and faced with an uncertain outlook. The fate of the 
nascent REDD+ mechanism may ultimately depend upon 
the adoption of an all-encompassing approach to forestry, 
agriculture and land-use activities in the framework of 
the ADP.6 
The future of negotiations on “various approaches” to 
mitigation, including the so-called new market mechanism 
first announced at COP-17, seems equally elusive. These 
issues will now be addressed by two separate working 
programmes of the SBSTA, which are expected to result in 
draft decisions to be considered at COP-19. The negotiation 
of these programmes may still provide a propitious 
opportunity to concretely discuss the establishment of 
market mechanisms under the Convention, in addition to 
those under the Kyoto Protocol. On the economic and social 
consequences of mitigation, the only notable development 
was that Parties seized an opportunity to reassert their 
concerns over unilateral action – such as that undertaken 
by the EU in connection with emissions from aviation 
– which “should not constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade”. 
The sections of the AWG-LCA decision on enhanced 
action on adaptation, technology development and transfer, 
and the provision of financial resources are even scanter 
than those on mitigation, with just a few paragraphs devoted 
to each issue. On all these matters, delegates did little 
more than see through and consolidate the considerable 
institutional developments that took place under the AWG-
LCA, such as the Green Climate Fund (to be headquartered 
in South Korea) and the Climate Technology Centre and 
Network (to be hosted by a UNEP-led consortium). In 
themselves, however, these institutions provide little hope 
for significant enhanced action, until a solution to the 
vexed question of finance emerges. COP-18 marked little 
progress towards mobilising US $100 billion for adaptation 
and mitigation by 2020, discussed under the Copenhagen 
Accord. Only marginal improvements were recorded on 
interim finance, with a small group of countries making 
little more than symbolic pledges up until 2015.7 This 
disappointing outcome is certainly not the result of lack 
of effort, given the large number of finance discussions 
on-going under the Convention. Faced with a formidable 
gap in finance, the scenario for future negotiations seems 
rather bleak. 
Some positive developments may come from the review 
of the long-term temperature goal, which will start in 2013 
and conclude in 2015, thus benefitting from input from the 
forthcoming IPCC report, as well as from a “structured 
expert dialogue” agreed in Doha.8 Other positive outcomes 
may come from “institutional arrangements” to address 
loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in 
developing countries, which are to be established at COP-
19.9 There is, however, considerable concern that migration 
of AWG-LCA to other institutional homes may lead to the 
re-opening of questions that have already been debated at 
length, and a consequent loss of precious negotiating time.10 
The Second Commitment Period of the 
Kyoto Protocol
Although Parties had already agreed upon a second 
commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol in 2011, the 
details were left almost entirely for decision at the Doha 
meeting. In 2012, therefore, the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the 
Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) convened for the last time to 
COP President Abdullah bin Hamad Al-Attiyah speaking with delegates 
 Courtesy: IISD
address a long list of contentious issues, including the term 
of the second commitment period; access to the flexibility 
mechanisms; and the carry-over of Assigned Amount 
Units (AAUs). 
Eventually, delegates reached a hard-won compromise 
over an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol.11 The 
amendment includes a new Annex B, listing quantified 
emission reduction commitments from 2013 to 2020 for 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway, 
Switzerland and Ukraine. The European Union stuck 
to its pledge to reduce emissions by 20 percent below 
1990 levels. Overall, these Parties must now individually 
or jointly ensure that their aggregate emissions “do not 
exceed their assigned amounts”, with a view to “reducing 
their overall emissions by at least 18 per cent below 1990 
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levels in the commitment period 2013 to 2020”.12 This 
commitment is well below the thresholds recommended 
by the IPCC and, reportedly, the pledges undertaken by 
this coalition of the willing are not a significant departure 
from business as usual.13
Several Parties, however, reiterated their willingness 
to increase the level of ambition, provided that certain 
conditions were fulfilled. These declarations are collected 
in footnotes appended to the amended Annex B. To enable 
future adjustments, the amendment includes a sui generis 
procedure, whereby Parties may propose increases of their 
quantified emission limitation or reduction commitments, 
which will be adopted by the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties (COP-MOP), unless 
more than three-fourths of the Parties object.14 To enhance 
the possibility of increased ambition, all Annex-I Parties 
have been requested to “revisit” their emission reduction 
commitments by 2014. While the ratification process is 
expected to be lengthy, Parties may already provisionally 
implement the amendment.15 In line with its extant 
legislative framework, the European Union has already 
announced its intention to do so.16
Another especially vexed question related to the 
treatment of Parties that refuse to accept quantified 
emission reductions for the second commitment period 
(i.e., Japan, New Zealand and the Russian Federation). 
The main issue was whether these Parties should continue 
to enjoy access to the flexibility mechanisms established 
under the Kyoto Protocol. Eventually it was agreed that all 
Parties included in Annex I may continue to participate in 
Clean Development Mechanism project activities, but that 
only Parties with a commitment inscribed in the amended 
Annex B are eligible to transfer and acquire certified 
emission reductions (CERs).17 An analogous decision has 
been made also with regard to Joint Implementation.18 
These restrictions, however, are not expected to have a 
major impact.19 
Reaching an agreement upon the carry-over of surplus 
AAUs from the first to the second commitment period 
was even more difficult. The question of surplus AAUs in 
former Eastern bloc countries has plagued implementation 
of the Kyoto Protocol from the very beginning. Over 
the years, Parties have unsuccessfully tried to reach an 
agreement on how to tackle the problem of so-called 
“hot air”. Negotiations on the second commitment period 
provided a propitious opportunity to address the problem. 
The issue, however, threatened to derail the whole 
process.20 Former Eastern bloc countries (particularly the 
Russian Federation, Belarus, Poland and Ukraine) were 
determined to maintain the possibility to benefit from 
AAUs in excess during the second commitment period. 
Their plea was met with the opposition of a large front 
of Parties concerned with the environmental integrity 
of emission reduction commitments. Compromise was 
reportedly gavelled by the European Union, which was 
itself torn between environmental integrity concerns and the 
need to accommodate the interests of Poland.21 Eventually, 
it was agreed to limit the amount of surplus units that may 
be carried over, and only Parties that have undertaken 
emissions reductions for the second commitment period 
have been allowed to do so.22 Most Parties have declared, 
however, that they do not intend to purchase/use AAUs 
carried over from the first commitment period.23 The 
Russian Federation tried to block the adoption of the 
AWG-KP outcome decision, and subsequently protested 
against an alleged violation of the rules of procedure by 
the Presidency. 24 It remains to be seen whether disgruntled 
Parties will now decide not to ratify the amendment to the 
Kyoto Protocol.25
Limited Progress under the Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action
The ADP was launched in 2011 with the mandate to 
develop “a protocol, another legal instrument or a legal 
outcome” applicable to “all Parties” and expected to be 
adopted by 2015 and implemented from 2020.26 This 
newly established platform has potentially opened the 
way to a new geometry of commitments, based on a “clean 
slate on differentiation” between Parties.27 The adoption of a 
legally binding agreement that includes emission reduction 
commitments for all Parties, however, remains but one of the 
possible outcomes opened up by the new negotiation scenario. 
At its first meeting in 2012, the ADP organised its work 
in two streams: one addressing the elements and modalities 
of a post-2020 regime and the other enhancing the level 
of ambition for the pre-2020 period. ADP negotiations in 
Doha followed this binary track. Cohabitation with the 
AWG-LCA and the AWG-KP, however, caused a few 
delays in work under these mandates.28 Negotiations were 
also weighted down by the re-emergence of contentious 
issues that had already afflicted the AWG-LCA.
The debate under the first post-2020 stream was 
dominated by issues of principle. Parties’ views diverged 
over the role that principles embedded in the UNFCCC 
should play in the new instrument to be developed by the 
ADP. The ADP mandate does not make any reference to 
such principles. Some States have tirelessly argued that 
Parties’ common – but – differentiated responsibilities 
should be revised in light of the changed reality compared 
with the time when the Convention was adopted, 
emphasising the infamous firewall between developed 
and developing-country Parties’ obligations. Conversely, 
several developing-country Parties, captained by China 
and India, have strenuously insisted that the ADP is not a 
forum to “renegotiate, rewrite or reinterpret” the principles 
underpinning the Convention.29 
In Doha, however, the developing-country Parties’ 
front initially appeared increasingly split. Although two 
new groups had emerged in the course of 2012, they were 
able to achieve a level of consolidation. On the one hand, 
the emergence of the “Association of Independent Latin 
American and Caribbean States” was reportedly inspired by 
“a collective conviction that a strong and robust Convention 
is the most effective way to achieve the objective of a 
below-2 degree world”.30 On the other, the “Group of 
Like-minded Countries” (comprising of members of the 
Arab Group, some Latin American countries, as well 
as India and China) pursues the objective to uphold the 
Convention’s principles of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and equity, as well as developed countries’ 
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historical responsibility for climate change.31 As a result 
of these divisions, the eventual outcome was a lean two-
page decision32 in which the Parties acknowledge that the 
work of the ADP “shall be guided” by the principles of the 
Convention, in spite of fierce opposition by the US who 
announced the intention to reject any attempt to invoke this 
provision in the ADP’s further work.33 
On a positive note, Parties agreed to move to a “more 
focused mode of work” in 2013.34 A work plan comprising 
additional sessions was adopted,35 and elements for a 
draft negotiating text will be considered “no later than” 
COP-20, with a view to making a draft text available 
“before May 2015”.36 The first stream of the ADP’s 
work has been asked to address mitigation; adaptation; 
finance; technology development and transfer; capacity 
building; and transparency of action and support – thus 
inheriting the unfinished work of the AWG-LCA. 
Parties and accredited observers have been invited to 
make submissions on issues such as application of the 
principles of the Convention; building on the experiences 
and lessons learned from other processes; the scope, 
structure and design of the new agreement; and ways of 
defining and reflecting undertakings.37 Under the second 
(pre-2020) stream, Parties and accredited observers have 
been asked to make submissions on options to enhance 
ambition before 2020, including again considerations 
over the application of the principles of the Convention 
to the ADP; mitigation and adaptation benefits, barriers 
and ways to overcome them, and incentives for action; 
as well as finance, technology, and capacity building to 
support implementation.38 
Some observers have expressed concern over the 
suitability of this timeline to ensure the adoption of a 
new instrument by 2015.39 Given the sluggish pace of 
negotiations, however, a tighter timeline would not have 
been realistic. As ever, the problem may not so much 
lie in the process, but in the lack of supporting political 
will. To confer much needed momentum to the ADP, in 
Doha the UN Secretary General announced his intention 
to convene world leaders in 2014, to help ensure that the 
2015 deadline is met.40 
Looking Ahead
With procedural questions addressed and the dismissal 
of the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP, the substantive work of 
the ADP may now begin without further ado. If, however, 
negotiations in Doha give a flavour of times to come, the 
road ahead is steep. Lack of common ground on the core 
of a future agreement – i.e., finance and wider commitment 
to reduce emissions, beyond the narrow path traced by 
the Kyoto Protocol – leads one to infer that the ADP is 
unlikely to succeed. The process initiated in Bali was 
officially closed in Doha without much progress towards 
a shared vision for long-term cooperative action to achieve 
the ultimate objective of the Convention. If anything, 
the humbling fate of the Kyoto Protocol and the difficult 
outlook for the ADP seem to show that Parties are more 
distant than ever from reaching consensus. It can only 
be hoped that the numerous opportunities for dialogue 
scheduled in preparation for COP-21 in 2015 will provide 
the scope to finally overcome the impasse that has affected 
this troubled international process for so long.
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